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In  this  note,  we  analyze  the  equilibrium  outcomes  of  pricing  games  with  product  differentiation  in 
relation with the extent of market coverage. It is a received idea in the IO literature that the horizontal and 
vertical models of product differentiation are almost formally equivalent. We show that this idea turns out 
to be wrong when the full market coverage assumption is relaxed. We then argue that there exist two 
fundamentally  different  classes  of  address-models  of  differentiation,  although  their  difference  is  not 
perfectly captured by the standard horizontal/vertical typology. 
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author. 1 Introduction
In this note, we propose to adapt the traditional distinction between horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiation to build an alternative typology that better reects the nature of strategic incentives
that rms face when choosing their products' characteristics. It has been recognized for long
that the introduction of product dierentiation is instrumental in escaping from the Bertrand
paradox. Firms are naturally inclined to dierentiate their products in order to increase their
market power, in particular under price competition. Address-models of product dierentiation,
as inspired by Hotelling (1929), are particularly suggestive. They make it explicit that, in order
to relax price competition, rms actually need a two-dimensional heterogeneity: products have
to dier in at least one characteristic, but the population of consumers must exhibit heteroge-
neous tastes as well. The relationship between these two dimensions of heterogeneity is crucial
in characterizing the nature of product dierentiation.
It is commonplace nowadays to distinguish between models of horizontal dierentiation and
models of vertical dierentiation. However, the extent to which this distinction really matters
for equilibrium outcomes is not clear. Several recent papers suggest that the horizontal and
vertical approaches of dierentiation are to a large extent equivalent. In particular, Cremer and
Thisse (1991) show that "every model belonging to a very large class of Hotelling-type models
(including all the commonly used specications) is actually a special case of a vertical dieren-
tiation model." This claim seems to be conrmed in Irmen and Thisse (1998): their analysis
of products' characteristics choices in a multidimensional setting suggests that the dierence
between horizontal and vertical characteristics does not really matter.1 As a matter of fact, IO
textbooks also seem to have chosen their side. They focus indeed much more on similarities
than on dierences. For instance Tirole (1988) starts the analysis of vertical dierentiation by
claiming that "The study of vertical dierentiation so closely resembles that of horizontal dif-
ferentiation...". Shy (1996), in his chapter 12, builds the analysis of his vertical dierentiation
model as a particular case of the Hotelling model. Martin (2000) also emphasizes similarities
between the two models. In a very recent contribution, Schmidt (2009) endorses a comparable
point of view: building on a theoretical set-up which is supposed to represent either vertical
or horizontal dierentiation depending on the interpretation given to the model's variables, he
establishes some policy recommendations which are invariant to the nature of dierentiation.
Curiously enough then, vertical dierentiation is also known to be a necessary condition for
the niteness property to hold. Generalizing the early arguments of Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979), Shaked and Sutton (1983) show that under vertical dierentiation there exists an upper
bound to the number of rms which may co-exist in the market in the long run, even when entry
cost is abritrarily small. This property is known as the niteness property. Under this property,
1The reader is referred to Cremer and Thisse (1991) and Irmen and Thisse (1998) for additional references on
the distinction between horizontal and vertical dierentiation.
1we may expect natural oligopolies to prevail, though exclusively under vertical dierentiation.
By contrast, the number of rms which may co-exist under horizontal dierentiation tends to
innity when entry cost tends to zero. In view of the preceeding statements, this last result is
surprising: if vertical and horizontal models of product dierentiation are essentially two faces of
the same coin, why is it that, in the long run, they possibly lead to radically dierent equilibrium
market structures?
In this note, we argue that the similarities between the vertical and the horizontal ap-
proach, as emphasized for instance by Cremer and Thisse (1991), Schmidt (2009) and in most
IO textbooks, are misleading. Those similarities are indeed formally established by relying on a
two-stage model where rms choose rst products' characteristics and then compete in prices.
The model is solved under the key assumption that the market is fully covered, i.e. consumers
never refrain from buying, whatever the choice of products' characteristics. As generally argued
in the literature, this assumption greatly simplies the exposition. Unfortunately it also hides
a key dierence between horizontal and vertical dierentiation. Actually, the extent of market
coverage, i.e. whether full coverage prevails or not in equilibrium, should be endogenous to any
two-stage model of dierentiation. Once partial market coverage is considered, a key dierence
emerges between the prototype models of dierentiation. In one class of models, akin to the
concept of variety dierentiation, rms may actually get rid of price competition through prod-
uct dierentiation whereas this is never possible under the other class, akin to the concept of
quality dierentiation.
2 An Example
Schmidt (2009) considers a population of consumers indexed by their type x. Types are uni-
formly distributed in the [0;1] interval with a density equal to 1. Each type x is characterized
by an indirect utility function W(x;q;p) = u(x;q) p. He consumes at most one unit of product
with attribute q  0.
Denition 1 A market is said to satisfy full coverage if and only if, at prevailing prices all
types x buy one product.
There are n  2 products with attribute qi  0, i = 1:::n. We assume that qi  qj if and
only if i  j.
Let us then characterize the type of dierentiation relying on the denition proposed in
Schmidt (2009):
Denition 2 A vertically (horizontally) dierentiated market is a market where consumers have
an identical (diering) preference ordering over the feasible product attributes.
There exist dierent versions of the denition in the literature but the present one is quite
representative. In particular, it is perfectly in line with the more restrictive denition put forward
2in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) or Tirole (1988) according to which vertical dierentiation
prevails when consumers agree on the ordering of products when they are sold at the same
price. This denition also captures the intuitive parallel which is made between vertical and
quality dierentiation on the one hand and horizontal and variety dierentiation on the other
hand.
As recalled in Schmidt (2009), it is often convenient to rely on the following complementary
denition
Denition 3 The preferred product version of type x, ~ q(x), is the version that yields the highest
surplus to type x, when all feasible versions are oered at their marginal cost c(q).
Relying on this second denition, it is clear that in a model where dierentiation relies on
quality levels, the preferred product version should be the same for all consumers if quality is not
costly, i.e. if c(q) = c  0. By contrast, we expect this preferred product to be specic to each x
under variety dierentiation. Notice that this second denition is also instrumental in checking
whether the niteness property holds or not. To put it simply,2 the niteness condition holds
whenever the preferred product is the same for all consumers in the market. This condition is
more demanding that vertical dierentiation as dened above. As originally argued in Cremer
and Thisse (1991) and recalled in Schmidt (2009), if the niteness property does not hold, a
formal equivalence is easily established between the vertical dierentiation model with quadratic
quality cost and the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs. Equivalence means
here that in equilibrium, the choice of the products' characteristics and the prices are identical.
Let us consider the following example which describes the two prototype models of product
dierentiation in the literature:3




Assuming that V is large enough to ensure full market coverage, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium is easily established. A little more work is required to establish the equivalence with
a Hotelling model under quadratic transportation costs, but not much!4 The corresponding
specication of the model for this last case is:
Model H :U0(:) = V + t +
(x   t)2
4
  p with n = 2 and t = 2q   1:
The basic intuition for understanding why this equivalence prevails is the following. By
assuming that V is arbitrarily large, we ensure that all consumers buy one unit either of good 1
or 2. Firms therefore compete for market shares and products attributes matter only for deciding
which rms gets which side of the market. The level of the prices which are to be considered
2The interested reader is referred to Shaked and Sutton (1983) for a detailed exposition.
3The example is directly taken from Schmidt (2009)
4The interested reader is referred to Schmidt (2009) for a more general and detailed argument
3are strictly below the lowest reservation prices for the two products. As a consequence, only
the price dierential matters for the consumers and it is sucient to identify the position of the
indierent consumer to dene rms' demands.
Let us denote this consumer by ~ x(p1;p2) and assume wlog that q1 < q2. It is immediate
to see that D1(p1;p2) = ~ x(:) and D2(p1;p2) = 1   ~ x(:) in either model V or H. In such a
case, the vertical or horizontal nature of the dierentiation is formally irrelevant. In the vertical
interpretation, the level of the marginal cost being quadratic in quality, the low quality rm
can always secure a positive market share on the left of the interval whereas in the Hotelling
interpretation, the rm located on the left side always secures a positive market share at the left
extreme of the interval. In other words, the behaviour of rms' demands at the price competition
stage are the same under vertical and horizontal dierentiation. Moreover, the quadratic cost
assumption, be it on transportation cost or quality cost, ensures that this is the case for all
possible relevant price subgames. At this step, it seems fair to conclude that model V and
model H are somewhat similar, if not strictly equivalent.
We question now the robustness of this result to the market full coverage assumption. To
which extent should we expect to obtain a comparable equivalence should V not be arbitrarily
large? The answer is almost immediate: we should not expect the previous equivalence to hold
anymore!
By denition, if the market is not fully covered, prices are such that for at least one con-
sumers' type, the best available option is to refrain from consuming, i.e. 9 x 6= 0 such that
W(x;qi;pi) < 0, i = 1;2. The relevant question is then : where do these refraining consumers
locate in the [0;1] interval?
Let us start with model V . According to the specication of U(:), all consumers agree on
a ranking according to which the preferred characteristics is the largest q. Therefore, vertical
dierentiation prevails. But more importantly, the surplus function associated with this speci-
cation is strictly increasing in x. We may dene by xi the type x which satises U(x;qi;pi) = 0.
Since q1 < q2, 8x < x1, not buying is preferred to buy i. All types x  x1 buy one of the two
products. The following property immediately follows:
Result 1 In the case utility is dened by U(:) = V + q + xq   p, for any feasible products'
characteristics, if the market is not fully covered, non buying consumers are located in a single
sub-interval of [0;1]. Moreover, rms' market shares are necessarily connected by an indierent
consumer.
Firms' demands are dened by D2(p1;p2) = 1   ~ x, D1(p1;p2) = ~ x   x1. A key feature of
this specication is that, because rms' market are connected, rms compete with each other
even though the market is not covered. This result must be contrasted with the specication of
demand in a non-covered market in model H. In model H, it is clear that the surplus function
is not monotonic in type x. More precisely, the sign of
@U0()
@x depends on x   t. An immediate
4consequence is the following result:
Result 2 In the case utility is dened by U0(:) = V + t +
(x t)2
4   p, if the market is not fully
covered, the position of non buying consumers in the [0;1] interval depends on the specication
of the products' characteritics ti. Non-buying consumers may be located in disconnected intervals
and rms' market shares need not be connected by an indierent consumer.
Suppose in particular that t1 =  1
4 and t2 = 5
4, which dene the equilibrium values in the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium under full coverage. Clearly enough, if V is such that the
market is not covered for some relevant price levels, the non-buying consumers will be located in
the middle of the [0;1] interval. Market shares are not connected anymore, which implies that
rms do not directly compete with each other but rather behave like local monopolists.
Summing up, we observe that, in sharp contrast with the fully covered market case, the spec-
ication of demand functions at the price competition stage will most often dier fundamentally
depending on whether model V or model H applies. As a consequence, payos function dier
and the formal equivalence of equilibrium outcomes disappears. To sum up, we may claim:
Proposition 1 The equivalence result established in Cremer and Thisse (1991) is not robust to
the introduction of non-covered market congurations.
This proposition is certainly not surprising. It nevertheless recalls that the similarities be-
tween vertical and horizontal models of product dierentiation are over-emphasized.
3 A Complementary Typology of Dierentiation Models
The vast majority of contributions that rely on address-models as vehicles to capture product
dierentiation retain the market full coverage assumption. No doubt this assumption simplies
the exposition! It turns out however that it is not made without loss of generality. In the previous
section, we have shown that it was critical in establishing the formal equivalence between some
classes of vertical and horizontal models. We investigate now in more depth what is further
revealed by the analysis of non-covered market conguration.
Assuming that the market is covered amounts to assume that the elasticity of aggregate
demand is zero. We now relax this assumption. Suppose then that all rms decrease their price
equally. The critical question is: who benets from the increase in market size? Under utility
function U0(:) there is no clear answer to this question. It always depends on the products' char-
acteristics and since the ranking of products' characteristics is not unanimous in the population,
the identity of those consumers who start buying and the rm to which they turn is essentially
indeterminate. Under utility function U(:) instead, it is always the case that the rst consumer
who starts buying as a consequence of a price decrease must be located in the vicinity of x1.
5As a consequence, additionnal consumers are always captured exclusively by the rm initially
serving the marginal consumer x1.
This last observation has far-reaching implications if one considers stage games with dier-
netiation precommitments. In two-stage games of dierentiation-then-price competition, rms
aim at segmenting the population of consumers through their choice of products' attributes.
The scope for relaxing price competition depends on the way heterogeneity in products' at-
tributes is combined with population' heterogeneity. By dierentiating their products, rms
actually decide on a particular sharing of consumers' types. In this perspective, a key concern
is the possible existence of a hierachy among consumers established by the rms. We argue
indeed that in order to better assess the nature of product dierentiation, it is useful to put the
standard approach on its head: instead of asking whether consumers are unanimous or not in
their ranking of products' characteristics (as in Denition 1), one may ask whether rms are
unanimous or not in their ranking of consumers' types. Consider the following denition of a
"preferred consumer", which is a slightly adapted version of Denition 2:
Denition 4 The preferred consumer of a rm which sells characteristic q is the consumer that
benets from the highest gross surplus in the population when consuming product q.
Extending this denition, one may wish to consider the preference ordering that rms would
establish over the set of consumers, depending on their own characteristics. It is then obvious
that in model V , the ranking established by rms does not depend on their precise character-
istics whereas it always does in model H. This mere fact induces a very dierent structure of
competition between the rms. In model V , indeed, rms will inevitably end up competing for
the same set of consumers, whatever the degree of product dierentiation they retain in the
rst stage. If, for some choice of characteristics, the market ends up being non-covered in a
price equilibrium, rms will nevertheles remain direct competitors. If q1 < q2, then rm 2 will
always end up selling to its preferred consumers whereas this will never be the case for rm
1.By contrast, in model H, rms dene their own ranking of consumers by deciding on their
characteristics. It may then happen that by dierentiating their products, the rms induce a
non-covered market conguration where they end up not competing with each other. To put
it dierently, product dierentiation induces heterogeneous rankings of consumers in model H
whereas it preserves the homogeneous ranking in model V . We propose the following typology
to summarize the above intuition:
Denition 5 A market is Absolutely Ordered (AO) whenever all rms have the same pre-
ferred consumer, irrespective of the product characteristics chosen by these rms. A market
is Relatively Ordered (RO) whenever the preferred consumer of a rm depends on its chosen
characteristic.
Notice that our typology is in line with the usual classication based on the quality vs
variety distinction. Quality dierentiation entails AO market with it, precisely because the basic
6assumption is that all consumers value quality. The heterogeneity in consumers' type therefore
reects dierences in levels of willingness to pay for quality upgrades; but whatever the quality
level, the preferred consumer is the one with the highest willingess to pay. By contrast, the
mere idea of variety dierentiation entails RO markets: when choosing a particular product
variety, a rm inevitably induces a specic ranking of consumers based on the preferences of
these consumers towards that particular variety. Denition 4 is also very much in line with
Denition 1. In the standard formulations retained in the literature, we expect that a vertically
dierentiated market is AO whereas a horizontal one is RO. Notice however that we may
easily think of vertically dierentiated markets which satisfy RO. Consider for instance the
following location model: the population of consumers is uniformly distributed in an interval
[a ;a+] 2 [0;1]. There are two feasible locations f0;1g. Depending on the position of interval
[a ;a+], we may either have horizontal or vertical dierentiation in the sense of Denition 1,
but it will always be the case that the market is RO: a rm locating at 0 has type a  as its
preferred consumer whereas a+ is the preferred consumer of a rm located at 1.
Since the connections between Denitions 1 and 4 are so close, it is legitimate to question
the usefulness of the AO   RO typology, as compared to the V D   HD one. The chief interest
of the AO   RO typology is to put emphasis on a neglected key driving force at work at the
level of product selection by the rms. What mainly governs the nature of strategic interaction
and the scope for product dierentiation is the extent to which product dierentiation allows
for segmenting the population of consumers. Under RO, product dierentiation is apt to create
localized competition (in the limit, it even destroys competition) while preserving the ability
for each rm to sell to consumers with the highest surplus for their products. By contrast,
under AO, only one rm will end up selling to the highest surplus consumers, all the other ones
will be conned to selling to "second-rate" consumers. In other words, product dierentiation
induces a hierarchy between rms under AO, but not under RO. Central to the nature of
product dierentiation is thus whether rms compete for the same consumers (AO) or segment
otherwise identical consumers (RO) through their product selection. Boccard and Wauthy
(2009) illustrates the importance of our typology. In that paper it is shown that whithin the
standard vertical dierentiation model popularized by Tirole (1988), rms actually choose not
to dierentiate their products by quality when they are allowed to commit to limited capacity
levels. The intuititon underlying this result is simple: since capacity constraints already limit
drastically price competition, rms are induced to select quality levels so as to maximize the
consumer welfare (that they will capture at the price competition stage), because the market is
of the AO type, they focus on the same set of consumers, for whom the surplus is maximized by
selecting the best available quality. Hence rms do not dierentiate their product in equilibrium.
A comparable no-dierentiation result would never obtain in a Hotelling model with capacity
commitment. The Hotelling model belongs to the RO types of models with the particular
feature that each consumer has his ideal type. In such a case, maximizing industry surplus
7requires product dierentiation for sure.
4 Final Remarks
In this note we have revisited the traditional distinction between horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiation. We started from a setup in which the two classes of model appear to be almost
equivalent. Then we showed that the similarities are not robust to the introduction of a partial
market coverage. Analyzing the behaviour of the model under partial market coverage led us to
propose an complementary typology of product dierentiation models, based on the preferences
rms displays relative to consumers' type, rather than the usual approach which relies on the
preferences of consumers relative to rms' products.
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